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ARTICLE
THE SOCIAL COST OF CARBON,
GREENHOUSE GAS POLICIES, AND
POLITICIZED BENEFIT/COST ANALYSIS
by: Benjamin Zycher*
ABSTRACT
Benefit/cost analysis can be a powerful tool for examination of proposed
(or alternative) public policies, but, unsurprisingly, decisionmakers’ policy
preferences can drive the analysis, rather than the reverse. That is the reality
with respect to the Obama Administration computation of the social cost of
carbon, a crucial parameter underlying the quantitative analysis of its proposed climate policies, now being reversed in substantial part by the Trump
Administration. The Obama analysis of the social cost of carbon suffered
from four central problems: the use of global benefits in the benefit/cost calculation, the failure to apply a 7% discount rate as required by Office of Management and Budget guidelines, the conflation of climate and GDP effects of
climate policies, and the inclusion of non-climate effects of climate policies as
co-benefits, as a tool with which to overcome the trivial temperature and other
climate impacts of those policies. Moreover, the Obama analysis included in
its “market failure” analysis the fuel price parameter that market forces are
likely to incorporate fully. This Article suggests that policymakers and other
interested parties would be wise to concentrate on the analytic minutia underlying policy proposals because policy analysis cannot be separated from
politics.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In its 2015 proposed “Phase 2” rule on Greenhouse Gas (“GHG”)
Emissions and Fuel Efficiency Standards for Medium and HeavyDuty Engines and Vehicles, the Environmental Protection Agency
(the “EPA”) asserted the following estimates of the central environmental effects attendant upon the proposed rule:
The results of the analysis, summarized in Table VII-37, demonstrate that relative to the reference case, by 2100 projected atmospheric CO2 concentrations are estimated to be reduced by 1.1 to 1.2
part [sic] per million by volume [ppmv], global mean temperature is
estimated to be reduced by 0.0026 to 0.0065 °C, and sea-level rise
is projected to be reduced by approximately 0.023 to 0.057
[centimeters.]1

In addition, the EPA estimated (in Table VII-37) that the rule would
increase ocean pH alkalinity (that is, would reduce “acidification”) by
0.0006 units.2
Those asserted environmental effects of the proposed rule are particularly interesting in the context of historical changes in the various
parameters and the EPA projections of baseline changes from 1990 to
2100.3 Figure 1 summarizes those data and projections.

1. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Fuel Efficiency Standards for Medium and
Heavy-Duty Engines and Vehicles, Phase 2, 80 Fed. Reg. 40138, 40408–49 (proposed
July 13, 2015) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 512, 523, 534, et. al.), https://www.regula
tions.gov/document?D=EPA-HQ-OAR-2014-0827-0002.
2. Id. at 40409 tbl.V-II-37.
3. Those projections were made with the EPA climate model (“Model for the
Assessment of Greenhouse-Gas Induced Climate Change, a Regional Climate Scenario Generator”) developed at the University Corporation for Atmospheric Research.
About, U. CORP. FOR ATMOSPHERIC RES., http://www.cgd.ucar.edu/cas/wigley/magic
c/ (last visited June 26, 2018) [https://perma.cc/HF2B-GLGT] [hereinafter MAGICC].
The model is available at http://www.magicc.org/ [https://perma.cc/TG42-SFTQ].

\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\6-1\TWL103.txt

2018]

unknown

Seq: 3

6-DEC-18

14:18

THE SOCIAL COST

61

FIGURE 1
Proposed Medium- and Heavy-Duty Engines Efficiency Rule in Context
Parameter

Historical Trend4

EPA 1990–2100
Projection5

Effect of Rule

CO2e Concentration

1.6ppm/year

+66 ppm

-1.1–1.2 ppm

Sea Levels

3.3mm/year

+23–56 cm

-0.23–0.57 mm

Ocean pH

~8.15 to 8.05 pH

-0.30 pH

+0.0006 pH

+1.8–4.8°C

-0.0026–0.0065°C

Temperature Change ~0.55°C

Consider the parameters summarized in Figure 1: the EPA estimates the effects of the proposed rule in the context of the historical
trends and the baseline projections for 2100. The estimated effect on
atmospheric concentrations of CO2e (a reduction of 1.1–1.2 ppm) is a
nine-month reduction in such concentrations from the historical average annual increase.6 Sea levels, with a long-term rise of 3.2 millimeters per year, would rise thirty-two centimeters over the course of a
century. Assuming the upper bound of the EPA projection (fifty-six
centimeters), the upper boundary of the rule’s purported effect (0.57
millimeters) is about 0.1%.7 For ocean pH, the effect of the rule is an
increase in average alkalinity (as purported for 2100) from about 7.80
to 7.80006.8 The temperature effect estimated between .0026 and .0065
degrees9 is effectively zero—it does not differ from zero as a matter of
statistical significance because the standard deviation of the surface
temperature record is about 0.11°C.10
4. NAT’L OCEANOGRAPHIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., CO2 (July 5, 2018), ftp://
ftp.cmdl.noaa.gov/ccg/co2/trends/co2_annmean_mlo.txt [https://perma.cc/4GP37UMW] (CO2e concentration); Anny Cazenave et al., The Rate of Sea-Level Rise, 4
NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 358, 358 (2014) (sea levels); Climate Change Indicators:
Ocean Acidity, ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/climate-indica
tors/climate-change-indicators-ocean-acidity (last updated Aug. 2016) [https://perma
.cc/4DWU-9VNS]; Michael Wallace, Ocean pH Accuracy Arguments Challenged with
80 Years of Instrumental Data, WATTS UP WITH THAT? (Mar. 31, 2015), https://
wattsupwiththat.com/2015/03/31/ocean-pH-accuracy-arguments-challenged-with-80years-of-instrumental-data/?cn-reloaded=1 [https://perma.cc/H2V8-BCFE] (ocean
pH); Roy Spencer, Latest Global Temps, DR. ROY SPENCER, http://www.drroyspencer
.com/latest-global-temperatures/ (last visited July 28, 2018) [https://perma.cc/43C7F4RC] (lower atmosphere temperature trend anomalies
5. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Fuel Efficiency Standards for Medium and
Heavy-Duty Engines and Vehicles, Phase 2, 80 Fed. Reg. 40138, 40409 tbl.V-II-37
(proposed July 13, 2015) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 512, 523, 534, et. al.), and
attendant discussion.
6. See supra Figure 1.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. See J. Hansen, et al., GISS Analysis of Surface Temperature Change, 104 J.
GEOPHYSICAL RES. 30,997, 31,006 (1999).
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The EPA then states that “[t]he agencies estimate that the proposed
standards would result in net economic benefits exceeding $100 billion, making this a highly beneficial rule.”11
How is it possible that the trivial temperature and other estimated
effects summarized above could yield more than $100 billion in net
economic benefits? The answer is found in the Obama Administration’s methodology for analysis of the social cost of carbon (“SCC”)—
that is, the estimated (or purported) marginal uninternalized economic damage caused by GHG emissions.12 This conclusion is possible only because of the assumptions and approach underlying the SCC
analysis, which, as discussed below, are deeply problematic.13 Those
underlying analytic problems can be summarized as follows:
• The use of “global” benefits from GHG reductions in the benefit/cost calculation;14
• The failure to apply a 7% discount rate to the stream of (asserted) future benefits and costs of GHG reductions, as mandated by Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”) analytic
guidelines;15
• The conflation in the integrated assessment models of climate
and gross domestic product (“GDP”) effects; and16
• The inclusion of non-climate effects of climate policies as cobenefits, as a tool with which to overcome the trivial temperature and other related impacts of those policies.17
Note that these analytic problems are independent of the climatology assumptions underlying the analysis of the costs of increasing atmospheric concentrations of GHG. Notwithstanding ubiquitous
assertions that the science is settled, in reality, it is not. The issue of
the equilibrium climate sensitivity of the atmosphere is hotly debated,18 and the existing body of evidence on temperature and other
11. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Fuel Efficiency Standards for Medium and
Heavy-Duty Engines and Vehicles, Phase 2, 80 Fed. Reg. 40138, 40169 (proposed July
13, 2015) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 512, 523, 534, et. al.).
12. See INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP ON SOCIAL COST OF GREENHOUSE
GASES, U.S. GOV’T, TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT: TECHNICAL UPDATE OF THE
SOCIAL COST OF CARBON FOR REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS UNDER EXECUTIVE
ORDER 12866 3 (2016), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-12/documents/
sc_co2_tsd_august_2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/XXS4-XWZ8] [hereinafter 2016 INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP ON SOCIAL COST OF GREENHOUSE GASES].
13. See supra Section II.
14. See discussion supra Section II.A.
15. See discussion supra Section II.B.
16. See discussion supra Section II.C.
17. See discussion supra Section III.
18. See, e.g., Patrick J. Michaels & Paul C. Knappenberger, The Collection of Evidence for a Low Climate Sensitivity Continues to Grow, CATO INST. (Sept. 25, 2014,
5:09 PM), https://www.cato.org/blog/collection-evidence-low-climate-sensitivity-continues-grow [https://perma.cc/TR74-3LKP] [hereinafter Michaels & Knappenberger,
The Collection of Evidence].

\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\6-1\TWL103.txt

2018]

unknown

Seq: 5

6-DEC-18

THE SOCIAL COST

14:18

63

climate phenomena is not consistent with the argument that climate
impacts are both visible and serious.19 Even the direction, let alone
the magnitude, of feedback effects are not known, and the same is
true with respect to how rising temperatures might affect such phenomena as weather patterns, ice sheet dynamics, sea levels, agriculture, ad infinitum.20 Moreover, the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change in its Fifth Assessment Report is deeply dubious
about the various extreme adverse effects popularized as looming impacts of increasing atmospheric concentrations of GHG.21 Scientific
“truth” is not majoritarian; it never can be “settled” because new evidence emerges constantly.
These observations are not relevant to the methodological critique
presented here, but the policy issues raised by the GHG/climate question would remain difficult even if there existed both unanimity and
certainty on the underlying scientific issues.
Section II discusses in more detail the first three analytic problems
noted above. Section III offers some observations on the application
of the estimated SCC in specific regulatory proposals with particular
emphasis on the use of “co-benefits” as part of the purported benefit
stream and on some benefit/cost issues in the larger context of GHG
policies. Section IV offers some concluding observations on the distinction between internalized and uninternalized parameters and on
the incentives of regulatory bureaus.
II. ANALYTIC FLAWS INHERENT IN THE OBAMA
IWG SCC METHODOLOGY
The Obama Administration estimated in 2016 an SCC of $36 (in
year-2007 dollars) per metric ton of CO2e in 2015.22 (That figure is
about $42 per metric ton in year-2017 dollars.)23 This dollar figure re19. See e.g., Benjamin Zycher, Paris in the Fall: COP-21 vs Climate Evidence, AM.
ENTERPRISE INST. (Nov. 30, 2015), http://www.aei.org/publication/paris-in-the-fallcop-21-vs-climate-evidence/ [https://perma.cc/J549-5SVE] [hereinafter Zycher, Paris
in the Fall]. See generally PATRICK J. MICHAELS & PAUL C. KNAPPENBERGER,
LUKEWARMING: THE NEW CLIMATE SCIENCE THAT CHANGES EVERYTHING xi–xv
(2015) (arguing that climate models have over-predicted the effects of increasing
atmospheric GHG concentrations) [hereinafter MICHAELS & KNAPPENBERGER,
LUKEWARMING].
20. Zycher, Paris in the Fall supra note 19.
21. See WORKING GROUP I OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE
CHANGE, WORKING GROUP I CONTRIBUTION TO THE IPCC FIFTH ASSESSMENT REPORT: CLIMATE CHANGE 2013: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, 12–78 & tbl.12.4
(2013), http://www.climatechange2013.org/images/uploads/WGIAR5_WGI-12Doc2b_
FinalDraft_Chapter12.pdf [https://perma.cc/UEF3-6CQT].
22. See 2016 INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP ON SOCIAL COST OF GREENHOUSE
GASES, supra note 12, at 4 tbl.ES-1.
23. See Table 1.1.4. Price Indexes for Gross Domestic Product, BUREAU OF ECON.
ANALYSIS (Aug. 29, 2018), https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/iTable.cfm?reqid=19&step=3&
isuri=1&1910=x&0=-99&1903=4&1904=2007&1905=2017&1906=a&1911=0 [https://
perma.cc/6R6C-5PSZ].
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sults in part from the use of a 3% discount rate, a methodological
approach that will be addressed more fully below.24 For now it is crucial to recognize that the SCC estimate is one central key to understanding how purported regulatory impacts that are effectively zero
can yield net economic benefits in the tens or hundreds of billions of
dollars. Once a non-trivial SCC figure is accepted for benefit/cost
analysis, the actual climate impacts of regulations—after all, they are
the supposed goal—become irrelevant.25 Merely multiply the purported reduction in GHG emissions attendant upon the regulation by
the estimated SCC, and large net benefits can be made to appear in
the benefit/cost analyses.26 Thus, the derivation of the SCC is crucial
to understanding this dimension of climate policymaking.
A. The Use of Global Benefits
Circular A-4, issued by the OMB, is explicit: only the benefits and
costs of regulations enjoyed or borne domestically are to be used in
benefit/cost analysis.27 International effects are to be reported separately.28 The reason for this is obvious: if domestic costs and global
benefits are used in benefit/cost analysis, then the United States would
have to bear all of the regulatory burdens for the entire world.29
The Obama Administration attempted to circumvent this obvious
and elementary economic analysis by arguing that the global-benefits
approach is appropriate for the SCC analysis because the effects of
increasing GHG concentrations are global in nature.30 That is a non
24. See discussion supra Section II.B.
25. Benjamin Zycher, The Achilles’ Heel of the Obama Climate Regulations, AM.
ENTERPRISE INST. (Feb. 9, 2017), http://www.aei.org/publication/the-achilles-heel-ofthe-obama-climate-regulations/ [https://perma.cc/H9HN-3PU8] [hereinafter Zycher,
Achilles’ Heel].
26. See INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP ON SOCIAL COST OF GREENHOUSE
GASES, U.S. GOV’T, TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT: SOCIAL COST OF CARBON FOR
REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12866 11 (2010), https://
www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-12/documents/scc_tsd_2010.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/F6PA-MRWK] [hereinafter 2010 INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP ON SOCIAL
COST OF GREENHOUSE GASES].
27. See Circular A-4, OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET (Sept. 17, 2003), https://obama
whitehouse.archives.gov/omb/circulars_a004_a-4/ [https://perma.cc/KTF8-AN6K]
(“[A]nalysis should focus on benefits and costs that accrue to citizens and residents of
the United States. Where you choose to evaluate a regulation that is likely to have
effects beyond the borders of the United States, these effects should be reported separately.”). See also Regulatory Impact Analysis: A Primer, JACOBS, CORDOVA & ASSOCIATES 5, http://regulatoryreform.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/USA-Circulara-4_regulatory-impact-analysis-a-primer.pdf (last visited July 28, 2018) [https://perma
.cc/2UKX-BH49].
28. Id.
29. In this case, U.S. policies would attempt to equate marginal domestic costs
with marginal global benefits.
30. See, COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS, 2017 ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE
PRESIDENT 423 (2017), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/
chapter_7-addressing_climate_change_2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/3LAD-EZRU].
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sequitur. In that case, the United States would reduce emissions of a
given effluent to the point that such emissions would be optimal for
the entire world with only the United States bearing the costs. If the
United States’ benefit/cost analysis incorporated both global benefits
and global costs, the enormous cost calculation would reduce the domestic political viability of any such United States policy, and in any
case, the country would not be able to enforce regulatory requirements on other nations in an effort to spread the costs. At the same
time, if all nations were to adopt a global benefit approach, the efficient level of effluents ostensibly would be achieved, but this ignores
the individual incentives to obtain a free ride on the efforts of others,
and so is not a reasonable underlying analytic assumption.31
The Obama-Administration SCC methodology means not only that
other economies would have incentives to allow the United States to
bear all of the attendant costs (that is, to engage in “free riding” on
United States policies), but also that it would be economically efficient
for them to do so. If they were to reduce emissions further, global
emissions would be lower than optimal because the global marginal
cost of emissions reductions (borne by the United States alone in this
framework) would exceed the global marginal benefits.32 This also is
inconsistent with the standard theory of efficient emissions reductions,
under which the marginal cost of those reductions is equated across
emitters.33
For example, the global benefits orientation is inconsistent with the
objective, implicit but clear, under the Obama Clean Power Plan34 of
regionalizing emissions reductions across the United States, ostensibly
to equate the marginal costs of reducing GHG emissions across states,
but actually to force most states into regional cap-and-trade wealth
transfer systems, the dominant feature of which would be payments
from red states to blue ones.35

31. See Zycher, Achilles’ Heel supra note 25.
32. This problem is separate from the industry relocation incentives yielded by the
adoption of such policies only by the United States. Note that in the 2010 Interagency
Working Group analysis, the domestic SCC is about 7–23% of the global value, or
about $3–10 per ton of GHG emissions if we apply the 2016 IWG estimate of the SCC
of $42 (year 2017 dollars) for 2015. See 2010 INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP ON
SOCIAL COST OF GREENHOUSE GASES, supra note 26, at 11; 2016 INTERAGENCY
WORKING GROUP ON SOCIAL COST OF GREENHOUSE GASES, supra note 12, at 29.
33. Zycher, Achilles’ Heel supra note 25.
34. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 60.5700–60.5880 (2017).
35. See Hearing on EPA’s Final Clean Power Plan Rule Before the H. Comm. on
Sci., Space, and Tech., 114th Cong. 6–7 (2015) (written testimony of Anne E. Smith,
Ph.D., Vice-President, NERA Economic Consulting), http://docs.house.gov/meetings/
SY/SY00/20151118/104182/HHRG-114-SY00-Wstate-SmithA-20151118.pdf [https://
perma.cc/6HEP-3HT7]; see also Benjamin Zycher, ‘Carbon Pollution’ and Wealth Redistribution, THE AMERICAN (June 26, 2013), http://www.aei.org/publication/carbonpollution-and-wealth-redistribution-2/ [https://perma.cc/JEK3-TG9H].
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The Trump Administration has re-estimated the SCC using only domestic benefits and costs, as summarized in Figure 2.
FIGURE 2
Domestic SCC, 2015–205036
(year-2017 dollars per metric ton)
Year

3% discount rate (“dr”)

7% dr

2015

5.50

1.10

2020

6.60

1.10

2025

7.70

1.10

2030

7.70

1.10

2035

8.80

1.10

2040

9.90

2.20

2045

9.90

2.20

2050

10.10

2.20

The domestic estimates presented in Figure 2 are an order of magnitude smaller than the global estimate ($42 per ton in year-2017 dollars) published by the Obama Administration, as noted above.37
B. Failure to Use a Seven Percent Discount Rate
OMB Circular A-4 requires federal agencies to apply both 3% and
7% discount rates to the streams of benefits and costs of proposed
regulations to allow a comparison of the respective present values.38
For its analysis of the SCC, the Obama Administration used 2.5%,
3%, and 5% discount rates, but not 7%.39 The reason for this is obvious: At 7%, the SCC becomes small or negative.40 Figure 3 summarizes the Dynamic Integrated Climate-Economy (“DICE”) model
baseline results for the analysis using 2300 as the end year.
36. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS
REVIEW OF THE CLEAN POWER PLAN: PROPOSAL 44 tbl.3-7 (2017), https://
www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2017-10/documents/ria_proposed-cpp-repeal_
2017-10.pdf [https://perma.cc/T77Y-4JYS]; and my computations.
37. See 2016 INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP ON SOCIAL COST OF GREENHOUSE
GASES, supra note 12, at 4 tbl.ES-1.
38. See Circular A-4, supra note 27. A-4 allows a 3% discount rate in addition to
the 7% rate if a consumption displacement model is deemed appropriate. Id. That
obviously is not solely the case for climate policies, which would affect investment
flows substantially; but A-4 (p. 34) requires the use of both 3% and 7% discount rates
so as to account for both the consumption and investment effects of proposed regulations, and to allow for sensitivity analysis.
39. 2016 INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP ON SOCIAL COST OF GREENHOUSE
GASES, supra note 12, at 3.
40. See ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, supra note 36, at 44 tbl.3-7.
FOR THE
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FIGURE 3
DICE Average Baseline SCC, End Year 230041
(year-2017 dollars)
Year

2.5% dr

3% dr

5% dr

7% dr

2010

54.27

35.00

10.27

4.68

2020

66.33

44.03

14.10

6.84

2030

77.51

52.60

17.86

8.97

2040

89.66

62.08

22.16

11.48

Figure 4 presents the same analysis using the Framework for Uncertainty, Negotiation, and Distribution (“FUND”) integrated assessment model.
FIGURE 4
FUND Average Baseline SCC, End Year 230042
(year-2017 dollars)
Year

2.5% dr

3% dr

5% dr

7% dr

2010

34.60

19.79

2.18

-0.62

2020

38.34

22.52

2.96

-0.43

2030

38.64

25.38

3.86

-0.15

2040

46.06

28.39

4.91

0.22

2050

50.08

31.53

6.12

0.73

In the DICE model, the difference in the SCC calculation for 2050
using 3% and 7% discount rates is 80%, declining from $71.92 to
$14.27 per metric ton.43 In the FUND model, the SCC for 2010–2050
at a 7% discount rate declines to approximately zero or becomes negative.44 Note that in the 2016 Obama Administration revision, the
2050 SCC is about $30 per metric ton (year-2017 dollars) at a 5% dis41. See William Nordhaus, Evolution of Modeling of the Economics of Global
Warming: Changes in the DICE Model, 1992–2017, 148 Climatic Change 623 (2018);
see also Kevin D. Dayaratna & David W. Kreutzer, Loaded DICE: An EPA Model
Not Ready for the Big Game, HERITAGE FOUND. (Nov. 21, 2013), http://thf_media
.s3.amazonaws.com/2013/pdf/BG2860.pdf [https://perma.cc/JA2V-RKCU]; and my
computations.
42. Dayaratna & Kreutzer, “Unfounded FUND: Yet Another EPA Model Not
Ready for the Big Game,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 2897, April 29,
2014, at http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2014/pdf/BG2897.pdf; and my
computations. See generally Description of Integrated Assessment Models FUND and
PAGE, GLOBAL CCS INSTITUTE, https://hub.globalccsinstitute.com/publications/soci
al-cost-carbon-closer-look-uncertainty/description-integrated-assessment-models (last
visited July 28, 2018) [https://perma.cc/9JY6-LJPA] (describing the FUND model).
43. See supra Figure 3.
44. See supra Figure 4.
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count rate, $80 at 3%, and $111 at 2.5%.45 The effect of changes in the
assumed discount rate is very substantial, and it is clear that the failure
of the Obama Administration to adhere to the requirements of OMB
Circular A-4 was driven by imperatives heavily political rather than
analytic.
The Obama Administration attempted to obfuscate this obvious underlying reason to shunt aside the requirements of OMB Circular A-4
by arguing that the use of an artificially low discount rate is appropriate methodologically as a device to give sufficient weight to the interests of future generations, the members of which cannot vote now.46
Consider this formulation of that stance from the Council of Economic Advisers:
The estimates of the cost of emissions released in a given year represent the present value of the additional damages that occur from
those emissions between the year in which they are emitted and the
year 2300. The choice of discount rate over such a long time horizon
implicates philosophical and ethical perspectives about tradeoffs in
consumption across generations, and debates about the appropriate
discount rate in climate change analysis persist.47

Accordingly, we must ask whether an artificially low discount rate
serves the interests of future generations. Consider a homo sapiens
baby born in a cave some tens of thousands of years ago, in a world
with a resource base virtually undiminished and environmental quality
effectively untouched by mankind. That child at birth would have had
a life expectancy on the order of ten years; had it been able to choose,
it is obvious that it willingly would have given up some resources and
environmental quality in exchange for better housing, food, water,
medical care, safety, ad infinitum.48 That is, it is obvious that people
willingly would choose to give up some environmental quality in exchange for a life both longer and wealthier. Few Americans, for example, would choose to live on a pristine desert island.
In other words, the central interest of future generations in this context is a bequest from previous generations of the most valuable possible capital stock, of which the resource base and environmental
quality are two important dimensions among many, and among which
there are always tradeoffs. That future bequest preference requires
efficient resource allocation by the current generation. If regulatory
and other policies implemented by the current generation yield less
45. See 2016 INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP ON SOCIAL COST OF GREENHOUSE
GASES, supra note 12, at 4 tbl.ES-1.
46. See, e.g., COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS, supra note 30, at 440.
47. Id.
48. On the life expectancy estimate, telephone interview with Gail Kennedy, Professor, Dep’t of Anthropology, Univ. of Cal. L.A. (Feb. 16, 2011). Note here the implicit normative assumption that the “interests” of any individual or group are those
that they would define for themselves or, more important, reveal through choice
behavior.
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wealth currently and a smaller total capital stock for future generations, then, perhaps counterintuitively, some additional emissions of
effluents would be preferred (efficient) from the viewpoint of those
future generations.49 In short, it is not appropriate to use an artificially
low discount rate to increase the weight given the interests of future
generations. Harberger and Jenkins estimate “social discount rates of
averaging around 8% for the advanced countries and 10% for healthy
developing countries and Asian Tigers.”50 Broughel estimates a social
discount rate of about 7%.51
Moreover, the economic costs of climate policies—increased energy
costs and attendant effects—are substantially more certain than the
benefits, that is, the future impacts of those policies in terms of temperatures and other such phenomena as storms and sea levels.52 That
latter uncertainty about policy benefits is driven by the reality that the
magnitude and even the direction of the feedback effects of increasing
GHG concentrations are unknown, so that the equilibrium climate
sensitivity of the atmosphere is substantially disputed in the scientific
literature.53 This means that the assumed benefit stream of such policies over time should be subject to a state-options analysis or, more
crudely, to an application of a discount rate higher than that applied
49. The capital stock includes both tangible capital and such intangibles as the rule
of law, the stock of knowledge, culture, and the like. Greater wealth for the current
generation yielded by resource consumption allows the expansion of other dimensions of the capital stock defined broadly.
50. Arnold C. Harberger & Glenn P. Jenkins, Musings on the Social Discount
Rate, 6 J. BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS 6, 6 (2015).
51. James Broughel, The Social Discount Rate: A Baseline Approach 24 (George
Mason Univ., Mercatus Ctr., Working Paper, 2017), https://www.mercatus.org/system/
files/mercatus-broughel-social-discount-rate-v1.pdf [https://perma.cc/P7L8-L7A4]. See
generally Robert S. Pindyck, Climate Change Policy: What Do the Models Tell Us?, 51
J. ECON. LITERATURE 860 (2013) (presenting a useful summary and critique of the
literature on social discount rates); Juzhong Zhuang, et. al., Theory and Practice in the
Choice of Social Discount Rate for Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Survey 2–14 (Asian Dev.
Bank ERD, Working Paper No. 94, 2007), https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/28360/wp094.pdf [https://perma.cc/YG9E-RSNH] (presenting a useful summary of the older literature on social discount rates).
52. Zycher, Achilles’ Heel supra note 25. Indeed, there is substantial evidence that
the shorter-term effects are likely to be positive on net, driven by increased agricultural output, improved agricultural and vegetation water efficiency, and similar effects
caused by a CO2 “fertilization” effect. See Change in Leaf Area (1982–2015), NASA,
https://www.nasa.gov/sites/default/files/thumbnails/image/change_in_leaf_area.jpg
(last visited July 28 2018) [https://perma.cc/XH88-7RS8]. Note that this recent greening is likely to have been the result of several factors, among them increased fertilizer
use, CO2 fertilization effects, and other factors. See World Food Situation, FOOD
& AGRIC. ORG. U.N., http://www.fao.org/worldfoodsituation/csdb/en/ (last updated
May 7, 2018) [https://perma.cc/DDC2-RGUY]; see also MGMT. INFO. SERVS., INC.,
THE SOCIAL COSTS OF CARBON?: NO, THE SOCIAL BENEFITS OF CARBON 3 (2014),
https://www.eenews.net/assets/2014/01/22/document_pm_03.pdf [https://perma.cc/
3QLK-MUHH].
53. See e.g., Michaels & Knappenberger, The Collection of Evidence, supra note
18; MICHAELS & KNAPPENBERGER, LUKEWARMING, supra note 19, at 81–85.
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to the cost stream.54 Note also that a future glaciation is very likely.55
Anthropogenic warming might prove highly advantageous during such
a period, particularly given that cold ambient temperatures are responsible for far more deaths than hot ones.56
C. Conflation of Assumed Climate and GDP Effects
In the integrated assessment models, the SCC is a percent decline in
projected GDP, translated into a dollar figure and then divided by
total assumed GHG emissions.57 That the GDP projections extend out
to the years 2150 and 2300, depending upon the particular analysis
being pursued, is a source of some amusement—even quarterly GDP
projections are problematic—the problems inherent in which are not
generally recognized. Nonetheless, it is not too unreasonable to use
historical long-term real GDP growth rates, or a range of them, to
make such projections. One real problem is that the central parameters driving long-term growth—labor inputs, capital investment, technological advances (“total factor productivity”), and legal and
regulatory institutions—are very difficult to predict over such longtime horizons.
In any event, the problem is that very small climate effects of changing GHG concentrations can yield a very large SCC if assumed future
GDP is sufficiently large. In the DICE model, the scenario with the
highest future GDP and a mid-range climate effect has the highest
SCC.58 The scenario with the smallest future GDP and the greatest
climate effects has the smallest SCC.59 Are these reasonable methodological outcomes?

54. See e.g., Daniel A. Graham, Cost-Benefit Analysis Under Uncertainty, 71 AM.
ECON. REV. 715, 716–19 (1981).
55. See e.g., Sandy Eldredge & Bob Biek, Ice Ages – What Are They and What
Causes Them?, UTAH GEOLOGICAL SURV. (Sept. 2010), https://geology.utah.gov/
map-pub/survey-notes/glad-you-asked/ice-ages-what-are-they-and-what-causes-them/
[https://perma.cc/JM6K-45E2].
56. See Antonio Gasparrini, et. al., Morality Risk Attributable to High and Low
Ambient Temperature: A Multicountry Observational Study, 386 LANCET 369, 373
(2015).
57. Paul C. Knappenberger & Patrick J. Michaels, The Current Wisdom: The Administration’s Social Cost of Carbon Turns “Social Cost” on Its Head, CATO INST.
(Apr. 3, 2014, 5:43 PM), https://www.cato.org/blog/administrations-social-cost-carbonturns-social-cost-its-head?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_cam
paign=Feed%3A+Cato-at-liberty+(Cato+at+Liberty) [https://perma.cc/FXZ7-UPM
H].
58. Id.
59. See Pindyck, supra note 51, at 860.
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III. CO-BENEFITS
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OTHER BENEFIT/COST PROBLEMS
SCC CONTEXT

IN THE

A. Reductions in Ozone and Other Effluents as Co-benefits
of GHG Regulation
The Obama Administration estimate of the SCC as applied to specific regulatory efforts is interesting. The respective benefit/cost analyses include not only the purported benefits of reductions in GHG
emissions but also those of reduced emissions of such other effluents
as sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxide, and fine particulates, and the resulting health effects of reduced ambient ozone levels.60 A close examination of the benefit/cost analysis for the Clean Power Plan (CPP)
reveals that the costs of that rule were discounted at a rate of 5%;61
accordingly, it is appropriate, narrowly, to use the EPA-claimed benefits of the rule for a 5% discount rate. Figure 5 summarizes those
estimates.
FIGURE 5
Clean Power Plan Net Benefits, 203062
(billions of year-2017 dollars)
Climate Benefits
Compliance Costs
Net Climate Benefits

Rate-Based Approach

Mass-Based Approach

7.0

7.0

9.2

5.6

-2.2

1.4

Air Quality Co-Benefits

25.3

21.2

Total Net Benefits

23.1

22.6

Notes. Air quality co-benefits reported for 3% and 7% discount rates. The figures
represented are the average.

The climate net benefits—ostensibly the very purpose of the Clean
Power Plan—are negative under the rate-based approach and very
small under the mass-based approach.63 It is the inclusion of purported air quality co-benefits that yields all or almost all of the net
benefits of the rule.64
This “co-benefit” approach is deeply problematic because the Clean
Air Act explicitly requires the EPA, upon making an “endangerment”
finding for a given effluent, to promulgate a National Ambient Air
60. See e.g., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, REGULATORY IMPACT
ANALYSIS FOR THE CLEAN POWER PLAN FINAL RULE 3-45 to 3-47 (2015), https://
www3.epa.gov/ttnecas1/docs/ria/utilities_ria_final-clean-power-plan-existing-units_
2015-08.pdf [https://perma.cc/JPB6-J8UR].
61. See id. at ES-21 to ES-22.
62. Id. at ES-21 tbl.ES-9, ES-22 tbl.ES-10; and my computations.
63. See supra Figure 5.
64. Id.
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Quality Standard (“NAAQS”) that “protects the public health” with
“an adequate margin of safety.”65 Accordingly, the EPA “co-benefits”
benefit/cost analysis is appropriate only if the existing NAAQS for the
various effluents fail to satisfy the requirements of the law or if the
law itself creates a standard that is inefficiently lax.66 If neither of
those conditions is true, then the co-benefits analysis will reduce emissions of the other effluents to levels that are inefficiently low, that is,
to levels at which the marginal costs of reductions exceed the marginal
benefits.67 At least one of those three conditions must be true. If a given
region is in “nonattainment,” that condition is evidence that achievement of the NAAQS is costlier than it would be worth, and that imposition of a standard even more stringent is unlikely to be
appropriate.68
Note that the Obama-Administration EPA used the same co-benefit analysis for the CPP, for the ozone rule,69 for the fine particulate
matter (PM 2.5) rule,70 and for the Utility Mercury and Air Toxics
Standards.71 Note also that the IWG in its SCC analysis used the assumed global benefits of reductions in GHG emissions as the basis for
the SCC analysis, while the CPP net benefits largely or wholly are
created by assumed reductions in domestic pollutants, as just discussed. This is an inconsistency that has gone largely unnoticed in the
Washington policy community.72
B. Benefit/Cost Analysis of GHG Policy in the Larger Context
As projected by the climate model developed by the EPA and used
for regulatory analysis,73 the future temperature effects of United
States and international climate policies are trivial or effectively
zero.74 Figure 6 summarizes those model projections under a set of
assumptions (in particular, a climate sensitivity of 4.5 degrees for a
65. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (2012).
66. Zycher, Achilles’ Heel supra note 25.
67. Id.
68. Cf. Don J. Frost, Jr. & Henry C. Eisenberg, Legislative, Regulatory and Judicial Challenges to the 2015 Ozone National Ambient Air Quality Standards, SKADDEN
(Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2017/01/legislative-regulatory-and-judicial-challenges-to [https://perma.cc/65YV-K5UE].
69. See National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone, 80 Fed. Reg. 65292
(Oct. 26, 2015) (codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 50.14, 50.19, 51.166, 52.21, 53.23, 58.10–58.11,
58.13, 58.50).
70. See Fine Particulate Matter National Ambient Air Quality Standards: State
Implementation Plan Requirements (Mar. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
§§ 51.1000–51.1016).
71. See Mercury and Air Toxics Standards (MATS) Electronic Reporting Requirements (Apr. 6, 2017) (codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 63.10021, 62.10031).
72. Zycher, Achilles’ Heel supra note 25.
73. This model was developed at the National Center for Atmospheric Research
with funding provided by the EPA. See MAGICC, supra note 3.
74. See infra Figure 6.
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doubling of GHG concentrations) that exaggerate the future temperature effect of given GHG reductions.
FIGURE 6
Land-Ocean Average Notional Temperature Reductions, 210075
(degrees Celsius)
Region Emissions Reduction

Temperature Reduction

U.S. (Obama 17%)

0.015

U.S. (China agreement, additional 10%)

0.010

China (assumed 20%)

0.200

Remaining Industrialized World (assumed 30%)

0.200

Remaining Developing World (assumed 20%)

0.100

Total

0.525

COP-21 (Paris) (immediate, strict relative to BAU)

0.170

Notes. This Figure assumes IPCC AR4 A1B midrange emissions path, climate
sensitivity 4.5°C. GHG emissions reductions from 2005 baselines: U.S. by 2020/
2025, others by 2030.76

The Obama-Administration Climate Action Plan called for United
States GHG emissions by 2020 17% below 2005 levels.77 In addition,
the United States-China Joint Announcement on Climate Change
called for an additional 10% reduction by the United States by 2025.78
The 17% reduction would decrease temperatures by the year 2100 by
.015 degrees.79 The additional 10% reduction yields another .01 degrees.80 Given that the standard deviation of the temperature record is
75. I made the computations using MAGICC, supra note 3.
76. For the COP-21 Agreement, see United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change, Paris Agreement, http://unfccc.int/files/home/application/pdf/paris_
agreement.pdf (last visited Sept. 21, 2018) [https://perma.cc/YN29-YYN5]. For the
COP-21 individual nationally-determined reductions from BAU, see United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change, INDCs as Communicated by Parties,
http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/indc/Submission%20Pages/submissions.aspx (last
visited Sept. 21, 2018) [https://perma.cc/Y42E-VG8P].
77. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE PRESIDENT’S CLIMATE ACTION
PLAN 4 (2013), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/image/president27sclimateactionplan.pdf [https://perma.cc/XK9P-KLJW].
78. See US-China Joint Announcement on Climate Change, OFF. PRESS SECRETARY, WHITE HOUSE (Nov. 11, 2014), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/
2014/11/11/us-china-joint-announcement-climate-change [https://perma.cc/6VSHSVPU]. See also Benjamin Zycher, Observations on the U.S.-China Climate Announcement, THE HILL (Nov. 14, 2014, 7:30 AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/punditsblog/energy-environment/224076-observations-on-the-us-china-climate-announcement [https://perma.cc/5GY7-88VX]; Benjamin Zycher, The U.S.-China Climate
Agreement Hangover, THE HILL (Dec. 8, 2014, 6:30 AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/
pundits-blog/energy-environment/226272-the-us-china-climate-agreement-hangover
[https://perma.cc/Y5WR-RFHZ].
79. See supra Figure 6.
80. See supra Figure 6.
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about 0.11 degrees,81 these effects would be too small to be distinguished from statistical noise, let alone to affect sea levels, cyclones,
and other climate phenomena. If we assume an additional 20% cut in
GHG emissions by China by 2030, temperatures would be reduced by
another 0.2 degrees,82 and if we assume a 30% cut in emissions by the
rest of the industrialized world, temperatures would be reduced by
another 0.2 degrees.83 If we assume also a 20% reduction by the lessdeveloped world by 2030, temperatures would be reduced by another
one tenth of a degree.84 The total: slightly more than 0.5 degrees.85
The entire Paris Agreement incorporates national commitments far
more modest; if implemented immediately and enforced strictly, the
effect would be a temperature reduction of 0.17 degrees by 2100.86
Note that these model predictions use underlying parameters highly
favorable to the policies under examination, that is, assumptions that
increase the predicted effects of the policies. The most important is a
“climate sensitivity” (the temperature effect in 2100 of a doubling of
GHG concentrations) assumption of 4.5 degrees, a number 50%
greater than the median of the range reported by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change in its latest assessment report.87 And
even the latter is about 40% higher than the median of the estimates
published in the recent peer-reviewed literature.88
In the context of benefit/cost analysis of regulatory proposals: how
much are such temperature effects—small or effectively zero—worth?
The answer is obvious, as is the underlying reason that the Obama
Administration used global benefits, an artificially-low discount rate,
and purported co-benefits in its analyses.
81. See J. Hansen, supra note 10, at 31,006.
82. Note that the Chinese INDC commitment at COP-21 was for a “peak” in
GHG emissions by 2030. There was no commitment on the level of that “peak,” and
no commitment on the path of Chinese GHG emissions after 2030. Enhanced Action
on Climate Change: China’s Intended Nationally Determined Contributions, U.N.
FRAMEWORK CONVENTION CLIMATE CHANGE 5, http://www4.unfccc.int/Submissions/
INDC/Published%20Documents/China/1/China’s%20INDC%20-%20on%2030%20
June%202015.pdf [https://perma.cc/7WYT-2D3D].
83. See supra Figure 6.
84. See supra Figure 6.
85. See supra Figure 6.
86. See supra Figure 6.
87. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014:
SYNTHESIS REPORT SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 10 (2014), https://www.ipcc.ch/
pdf/assessment-report/ar5/syr/AR5_SYR_FINAL_SPM.pdf [https://perma.cc/C3PUS96E].
88. See Nic Lewis, How Sensitive is Global Temperature to Cumulative CO2 Emissions?, JUDITH CURRY (July 14, 2018), https://judithcurry.com/2015/11/30/how-sensitive-is-global-temperature-to-cumulative-co2-emissions/#more-20572 [https://perma
.cc/8ESQ-TTRB] (discussing the recent estimates in the peer-reviewed literature);
Judith Curry, Climate Sensitivity: Lopping Off the Fat Tail, JUDITH CURRY (Mar. 23,
2015), https://judithcurry.com/2015/03/23/climate-sensitivity-lopping-off-the-fat-tail/
[https://perma.cc/6PT3-HC5V]; Michaels & Knappenberger, The Collection of Evidence, supra note 18.

\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\6-1\TWL103.txt

2018]

unknown

Seq: 17

THE SOCIAL COST

6-DEC-18

14:18

75

IV. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
Let us return to the EPA proposed “Phase 2” efficiency rule for
medium and heavy trucks with which this discussion began.89 Despite
the fact that GHG policy, ostensibly, is an effort to correct for a private-sector inefficiency—the purported adverse effects of GHG emissions are not reflected in market prices—the Phase 2 rule refers to
“fuel savings” almost 200 times, and it is those asserted fuel savings
that in substantial part drive the estimated benefits of the rule.90 The
rule states explicitly that it “estimate[s] the changes in fuel expenditures, or the fuel savings, using fuel prices estimated in the Energy and
Information Administration’s [(“EIA”)] 2014 Annual Energy Outlook.”91 For gasoline, that EIA projection for year 2020 is a per-gallon
price of $3.32 in year-2017 dollars.92
Note that the average gasoline price at that time was about $2.50.93
Accordingly, an assumed price of $3.32 in 2020 implies a real price
increase of about 10% annually.94 That assumed price path is inconsistent with standard economic analysis, which predicts that the expected
price path for a good the consumption of which is substitutable over
time (that is, that can be stored more-or-less economically) should rise
at the market rate of interest.95 Since interest rates are far lower than
10% (the interest rate on AAA corporate bonds is about 4%96), one
wonders why gasoline stocks are not rising sharply so as to take advantage of so rapid an increase in expected prices. Why did the EPA
in its analysis of this rule not use market expectations as reflected in
futures prices?
More fundamentally, in what sense are fuel costs not internalized
fully in market prices? Is it reasonable to assume for analytic purposes
89. See Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Fuel Efficiency Standards for Medium
and Heavy-Duty Engines and Vehicles, Phase 2, 80 Fed. Reg. 40138, 40408–49 (proposed July 13, 2015) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 512, 523, 534, et. al.).
90. See id. at 40166 tbl.I-8.
91. See id. at 40440 & tbl.IX-6; and accompanying discussion.
92. See Energy Price by Sector and Source, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (2014), https://
www.eia.gov/outlooks/archive/aeo14/pdf/tbla3.pdf [https://perma.cc/6YHP-A3YE].
Reference cases. Assumes 120,476 btu per gallon of gasoline. See Energy Units and
Calculators Explained, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/
index.cfm?page=about_energy_units (last visited July 28, 2018) [https://perma.cc/
ZN6Y-VBQV].
93. See Weekly Retail Gasoline and Deiseal Prices, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., https://
www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_pri_gnd_dcus_nus_a.htm (last visited July 28, 2018) [https:/
/perma.cc/WX6J-3ZYG].
94. Compute (3.32/2.50)1/3 = 1.0992.
95. See Benjamin Zycher, World Oil Prices: Market Expectations, the House of
Saud, and the Transient Effect of Supply Disruptions, AM. ENTERPRISE INST. 4 (June
2, 2016,), http://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/World-Oil-Prices.pdf [https:/
/perma.cc/5QTG-9CFC].
96. See Interest Rates and Bond Yields, U.S. GOV’T PUB. OFFICE (May 2018),
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/ECONI-2018-05/pdf/ECONI-2018-05-Pg30.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DDC4-SYCT].
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that the EPA projection of future fuel prices is better than that of the
decentralized market? Is it the government or millions of private-sector decisionmakers, who have their own money at risk, which have the
more powerful incentives to make unbiased price predictions?
The analytic saga of the SCC and the GHG regulatory framework
appears to comport with the standard literature predicting that government agencies have powerful incentives to maximize their budgets
(or some such variation as their discretionary budgets).97 Even if we
shunt aside all of the analytic problems inherent in that body of climate regulatory policymaking—all of which is biased in favor of regulatory action—the regulations are all cost and no benefit. What other
set of incentives can explain such agency behavior? Policy analysis
cannot be separated from politics.
97. See William A. Niskanen, Bureaucrats and Politicians, 18 J. L. & ECON. 617,
618 (1975); William A. Niskanen, Bureaucracy, and Kelly H. Chang, et. al., Rational
Choice Theories of Bureaucratic Control and Performance, in THE ELGAR COMPANION TO PUBLIC CHOICE 258, 262–67, 271-292 (William F. Shughart II & Laura Razzolini, eds., 2001); DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE III 359–385 (2003).

